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Abstract—Access control to data in traditional enterprises is typically enforced through reference monitors. However, as more
and more enterprise data is outsourced, trusting third party storage servers is getting challenging. As a result, cryptography,
specifically Attribute-based encryption (ABE) is getting popular for its expressiveness. The challenge of ABE is revocation.
To address this challenge, we propose PIRATTE, an architecture that supports fine-grained access control policies and dynamic
group membership. PIRATTE is built using attribute-based encryption; a key and novel feature of our architecture, however, is
that it is possible to remove access from a user without issuing new keys to other users or re-encrypting existing ciphertexts. We
achieve this by introducing a proxy that participates in the decryption process and enforces revocation constraints. The proxy
is minimally trusted and cannot decrypt ciphertexts or provide access to previously revoked users. We describe the PIRATTE
construction and provide a security analysis along with performance evaluation. We also describe an architecture for online social
network that can use PIRATTE, and prototype application of PIRATTE on Facebook.
Index Terms—Attribute-based Encryption, Revocation, Access Control, Social Networking
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1 INTRODUCTION
Access control to data in traditional enterprises is
typically provided by reference monitors that enforce
a particular policy. This approach, however, creates
a vulnerability for monitors that are buggy or com-
promised and thus do not enforce the correct policy.
This is a particular concern in large, distributed en-
terprises, as well as Online Social Networks (OSNs),
where recent privacy compromises showcase the dan-
gers of entrusting privacy controls to social network
providers [1], [2]. The problem gets challenging as
enterprises outsource more and more data, and rely
on third party storage servers to enforce the access
policy.
Attribute-based encryption (ABE) [3], [4], [5] pro-
vides an alternative approach to data protection,
where the ability to decrypt data items is controlled by
a policy specified in terms of attributes. ABE systems
mimic the expressiveness of traditional access control
systems, but use cryptography instead of reference
monitors. In enterprises, this means that data can be
sent over channels and stored on media that might
at some point become compromised without fear of
a privacy breach. Among several existing schemes,
Ciphertext Policy ABE (CP-ABE) [4] is appropriate
for most applications. In CP-ABE, the encryptor uses
some public parameters and a policy described over
attributes to encrypt a piece of data. Different secret
keys are issued for different sets of attributes. A
key that has enough attributes to satisfy the policy
decrypts the ciphertext.
Various applications can benefit from the flexibility
and expressiveness of ABE, but require the support
of frequent revocation. ABE falls short in such areas
when frequent and immediate revocation of access
is required. Researchers have proposed revocation
by attaching an expiry date to the keys [4], [5] or
introducing proxies [6]. However, existing approaches
come with their shortcomings either by introducing
delay in revocation, increasing the size of ciphertext,
or affecting (re-keying) all the users including both
the revoked and non-revoked ones.
In this paper, we present PIRATTE, a proxy-based
immediate revocation scheme for CP-ABE. Our design
makes use of a minimally trusted proxy, which han-
dles revoked users and attributes. Upon revocation,
no new key is generated for any user, neither is the
existing data re-encrypted. We believe this feature is
key for access control in any context where ABE is
used together with highly dynamic group member-
ship and large datasets. Note that the proxy is min-
imally trusted: it cannot decrypt by itself, and even
if it were compromised, it cannot allow previously
revoked users to decrypt either. The only assumption
we hold is that the proxy is updated with a new
key each time a revocation takes place. PIRATTE
ensures forward secrecy, backward secrecy with some
assumptions, immediate revocation of complete or
partial access, and delegation of access with single
and multiple key authorities.
Our Contribution:
• We provide the construction of our scheme in-
cluding Proxy-based key/attribute revocation and
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2access delegation, and the security analysis of the
scheme.
• We implement a prototype named PIRATTE and
compare its performance with the CP-ABE scheme
by Bethercourt et al. [4] (BSW CP-ABE).
• In addition, we describe a case study that can
benefit from using PIRATTE. We choose OSN since
recent research in OSNs proposes the use of cryp-
tography to enhance privacy [7], [8], [9]. However,
they are not completely successful because of some
shortcomings of existing cryptographic schemes.
We also present an application of PIRATTE running
on Facebook platform.
Roadmap:
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We
briefly discuss background information on CP-ABE
and the base revocation scheme in Section 2. Next, we
provide a detailed description of our construction in
Section 3. Section 4 discusses the security of our con-
struction. We describe the applicability of PIRATTE
to OSNs in Section 5. We describe our performance
analysis and the Facebook application in Section 6,
related work in Section 7, and conclude in Section 8.
2 BACKGROUND
In this section we describe some background informa-
tion necessary to understand our scheme. We describe
two cryptographic schemes that form the foundation
of our approach.
2.1 Attribute-Based Encryption
Cryptography can be used to enforce access control
to information by encrypting data such that only au-
thorized users can decrypt it. However, with standard
public-key cryptography, it is necessary to explicitly
enumerate all of the users who may decrypt each data
item. While it is possible to issue group keys, this
creates complex key management issues and several
problems still remain.
Attribute-based encryption provides a better solu-
tion for defining fine-grained access control to groups
of people. With ABE, a user Alice assigns sets of
attributes to other users (we will call these users
Alice’s contacts) and issues the corresponding secret
keys. She encrypts data items using policies expressed
in terms of plain attributes that defines what attributes
one must have in order to decrypt the piece of data
(this variant is called ciphertext-policy ABE; key-policy
ABE reverses the process, with attributes assigned to
data items and policies to keys).
ABE can support complex policies, such as “(Friend
OR Co-worker) AND Neighbor”. ABE also explicitly
prevents collusion between users: if Bob is Alice’s co-
worker, and Carol is her neighbor, they cannot com-
bine their attributes together to satisfy the above pol-
icy if neither of them satisfies it individually. Finally,
ABE provides public-key functionality, allowing, for
example, Bob to encrypt a message with Alice’s public
key to be decrypted by her contacts to whom Alice
assigns secret attribute keys.
We can formally define a CP-ABE scheme by four
algorithms with an option for attribute delegation [4]:
• SETUP. This algorithm takes security parameters
and generates a public key PK and master secret
key MK.
• ENCRYPT(PK,M,P ). This algorithm takes the pub-
lic key PK, a message M , and a policy P and
generates a ciphertext CT encrypted with P .
• KEYGEN(MK,S). This algorithm uses the master
secret key MK to generate a secret attribute key
SK using the attributes in the set S.
• DECRYPT(CT, SK). This algorithm decrypts a ci-
phertext CT to plaintext M as long as the set
of attributes S in SK satisfies the policy P that
was used to generate CT from M . (The policy is
implicitly encoded in CT .)
• DELEGATE(SK, S˜). The delegate algorithm takes as
input a secret key SK for some set of attributes S
and a set S˜ ⊆ S. It outputs a secret key ˜SK for the
set of attributes S˜.
2.2 Revocation Scheme
To support practical revocation in PIRATTE, we adapt
the broadcast revocation scheme developed by Naor
and Pinkas to prevent digital piracy [10]. The scheme
uses Shamir secret sharing [11] to create shares of
a secret key, where t + 1 shares are necessary for
reconstruction, and gives one share to each user.
During regular operation, the distributor broadcasts
t random shares, which lets any user to reconstruct
the secret key by combining the shares with his or
her own. To revoke up to t users, the distributor
broadcasts their shares instead of the random ones.
Any non-revoked user still has t + 1 distinct shares
and can reconstruct the secret, whereas the revoked
users do not have enough information even if they
all collude.
3 CONSTRUCTION
3.1 Assumptions and Basics
Before going into the details of the construction, we
present some basic mathematical assumptions, and
the details of CP-ABE and the revocation scheme used
in PIRATTE.
Bilinear Pairing
Let G1, G2, and GT be multiplicative cyclic groups of
prime order p, and e a map (G1×G2 → GT ). Let g1 and
g2 be generators of G1 and G2 respectively (Gi = 〈gi〉).
If ∀u ∈ G1, v ∈ G2 and a, b ∈ Zp, e(ua, vb) = e(u, v)ab
3and e(g1, g2) 6= 1, then e is called a bilinear pairing. If
G1 = G2, it is called a symmetric pairing, otherwise
the pairing is asymmetric.
Secret Sharing
In Shamir’s secret sharing scheme [11], a secret s in
some field F is shared among n parties by creating
a random polynomial P ∈ F [x] of degree t such that
P (0) = s. The i-th party gets the share 〈i, P (i)〉. Given
any t + 1 shares P (x0), . . . , P (xt), it is possible to
recover P (0) using Lagrange interpolation:
P (0) =
t∑
i=0
λiP (xi), where λi =
∏
j 6=i
xj
(xj − xi)
BSW CP-ABE Scheme
The algorithms in CP-ABE due to the Bethencourt
et al. are described below. Though CP-ABE uses
symmetric pairing, it can be implemented using an
asymmetric pairing as well.
• SETUP: The key authority KA generates a public
key PK, and a master secret key MK:
PK = G1, g, h = gβ , e(g, g)α
MK = (β, gα)
where random α, β ∈ Zp,G1 = 〈g〉, |G1| = p
The PK also contains an extra component f = g1/β
to support attribute delegation.
• ENCRYPT(PK, M, τ ): A policy is represented as an
access tree structure τ with the attributes at leaves
and threshold k-of-n gates at intermediate nodes.
Each node is associated with a polynomial qx of
degree dx, where dx is 1 less than the threshold
value k of that node. The polynomials are of degree
0 for OR gates and leaves. The secret s (random
s ∈ Zp) to blind the data M is associated with the
polynomial at the root of the tree, i.e., qR(0) = s.
The sharing works in a top down manner: for all
other nodes, qx(0) = qparent(x)(index(x)). index(x)
returns a number between 1 and num associated
with x where num is the number of children of
parent(x). Let Y be the set of leaf nodes in τ . The
ciphertext CT is:
CT = (τ, C˜ =Me(g, g)αs, C = hs,
∀y ∈ Y : Cy = gqy(0), C ′y = H(att(y))qy(0))
Here, H : {0, 1}∗ → G1 is a hash function, modeled
as random oracle, that maps string attribute to
random element of G1.
• KEYGEN(MK, S): The secret key SK correspond-
ing to a set of attributes S is (random r, rj ∈ Zp):
SK =(D = g(α+r)/β ,
∀j ∈ S : Dj = grH(j)rj , D′j = grj )
Dj , D
′
j for each attribute are blinded by rj , and
all the components are tied together using r in
D. This prevents attributes of different users from
being combined together and provides collusion
resistance.
• DECRYPT(CT, SK): The goal of decryption algo-
rithm is to find out e(g, g)αs. It finds out the secret
qx(0) at each node x blinded by the random value
r. A secret key SK that achieves dR such secrets at
the root R, can solve the polynomial qR and decrypt
the ciphertext. A recursive algorithm DecryptNode
pairs Di and D′i (from SK) with Cx and C
′
x (from
CT ) respectively and returns e(g, g)rqx(0) for each
leaf node x in the τ in CT , iff i = attr(x). i ∈ S
is the set of attributes for which a user is assigned
SK.
At each non-leaf node, Lagrange interpolation is
used on at least k (the threshold value of the node)
such e(g, g)rqz0 received from its children z, to cal-
culate e(g, g)rqx(0). Let A = e(g, g)rqR(0) = e(g, g)rs.
Then C˜, C,D and A are used in bilinear mapping to
cancel out e(g, g)rs, and retrieve M . Further details
can be found in [4].
• DELEGATE(SK, S˜). The delegate algorithm re-
randomizes the relevant set of attributes S˜ ⊆ S of a
secret key SK assigned for some set of attributes S.
It outputs a secret key ˜SK for the set of attributes
S˜.
˜SK =(D˜ = Df r˜,
∀k ∈ S˜ : D˜k = Dkgr˜H(k)r˜k , D˜′k = D′kgr˜k)
Revocation Scheme of Naor and Pinkas
This scheme consists of 2 phases:
• Initialization: The group controller generates a ran-
dom polynomial P of degree t over Zp. It sends a
personal key 〈Iu, P (Iu)〉 to each user u with random
identity Iu. This process is performed only once for
all future revocations.
• Revocation: The group controller learns the ran-
dom identities of t users Iu1 , . . . , Iut that should
be revoked. At most t users can be revoked
since the scheme depends on polynomial secret
sharing. It then chooses a random r, and sets
the new key to be grP (0), that would be un-
known to revoked users. It broadcasts the message
gr, 〈Iu1 , grP (Iu1 )〉, . . . ., 〈Iut , grP (Iut )〉 encrypted with
the current group key. Each non revoked user can
compute grP (Iu) and combine it with the broadcast
values to obtain grP (0) using Lagrange’s interpola-
tion formula. Further details can be found in [10].
3.2 Proxy-based Complete Key Revocation
In this section we describe how to completely re-
voke keys from parties. That means, all the privileges
granted by the key authority are revoked from one or
more contact(s). This construction allows revocation
4of up to t users at a time since it is based on the
scheme in [10] described before.
Intuition:
The master key MK contains a polynomial P of
degree t. P (0) is used to blind users’ secret keys. Each
user u also gets a random share P (u) of P (0) in her
key. The proxy key consists of t such shares and is
used to convert a part of the ciphertext for decryption.
Whenever access is revoked from someone, her share
becomes a part of the proxy key, and eventually the
converted ciphertext. Therefore, the revoked user does
not have enough points, i.e. (t+ 1) points to unblind
her key and the ciphertext and decrypt it. However,
non-revoked users can always combine their secret
keys with the ciphertext and hence decrypt it.
When no one is revoked, the proxy key consists of
t random P (u) points. Since the revocation is based
on polynomial secret sharing, and the degree of the
polynomial is t, the scheme is limited to maximum
t revocations. Though each time t different users can
be revoked, the total number of users in the system
is not limited.
- SETUP: The key authority KA randomly generates
a polynomial P of degree t (the maximum number of
revoked users) over Zp, sets the broadcast secret P (0)
to be used after revocation, and randomly chooses
α, β ∈ Zp. She generates PK and MK as follows:
PK = G1,G2, g1, g2, h = gβ1 , e(g1, g2)
α
MK = β, gα2 , P
- ENCRYPT(PK, M, τ ): Let Y be the set of leaf
nodes in τ . Data M is encrypted to get the ciphertext
CT . Other than the asymmetric groups, this algorithm
works exactly the same as in BSW CP-ABE.
CT = (τ, C˜ =Me(g1, g2)
αs, C = hs = gβs1 ,
∀y ∈ Y : Cy = gqy(0)1 , C ′y = H(att(y))qy(0) = ghyqy(0)2 )
where H : {0, 1}∗ → G2 and hy = logg2 H(att(y))
(used for notational convenience only).
- KEYGEN(MK, S): The algorithm KeyGen outputs
the secret key corresponding to the set of attributes
S, blinded by P (0) from MK. We introduce an ex-
tra component— D′′j —that in addition to attribute
information contains user information. Without loss
of generality, we assume user uk receives this key.
SK = (D,∀j ∈ S : 〈Dj , D′j , D′′j 〉),where
D = g
(α+r)/β
2 ,
Dj = g
r
2H(j)
rjP (0) = g
r+hjrjP (0)
2 ,
D′j = g
rj
1 ,
D′′j = (D
′
j)
P (uk) = g
rjP (uk)
1
- PROXYREKEY(PK, MK, RL): Whenever the KA
wants to revoke keys from social contacts, she creates
a list of revoked users RL with their identities ui,
i ∈ {1, . . . , t}, and evaluates the corresponding P (ui)
using MK. She gives the proxy key PXK to the
proxy. In case of no or fewer than t revocations, the
KA generates random 〈x, P (x)〉 other than the actual
user identities, to make PXK of length t.
PXK = ∀ui ∈ RL : 〈ui, P (ui)〉
- CONVERT(PXK, ∀y ∈ Y : Cy , uk): The proxy
uses its key PXK and the decryptor’s identity uk to
calculate C ′′y as follows:
∀i, j ∈ {1, . . . , t}, k /∈ {1, . . . , t},
λi =
uk
uk − ui ·
∏
j 6=i
uj
(uj − ui) ,
∀y ∈ Y : C ′′y = (C ′y)
∑t
i=1 λiP (ui) = g
hyqy(0)
∑t
i=1 λiP (ui)
2
Since the user secret key SK is blinded by P (0), she
needs C ′′y in addition to Cy and C ′y for decryption.The
proxy also calculates λk and gives it to the user uk.
- DECRYPT(CT, SK): The decryption steps involve
one extra pairing than BSW CP-ABE at each leaf node
of the policy. For each leaf node x where i = attr(x),
if i ∈ S, (S is the set of attributes for which SK is
issued) then,
DecryptNode(CT, SK, x)
=
e(Cx, Di)
e(D′′i , C ′x)λke(D
′
i, C
′′
x )
=
e(g1, g2)
rqx(0)+hiriP (0)qx(0)
e(g1, g2)rihiqx(0)λkP (uk)e(g1, g2)
rihiqx(0)
∑t
j=1 λjP (uj)
=
e(g1, g2)
rqx(0)+hiriP (0)qx(0)
e(g1, g2)
rihiqx(0)(
∑t
j=1 λjP (uj)+λkP (uk))
=
e(g1, g2)
rqx(0)+hiriP (0)qx(0)
e(g1, g2)rihiqx(0)P (0)
, k 6∈ {1, 2, . . . , t}
= e(g1, g2)
rqx(0)
Otherwise DecryptNode returns ⊥. The rest of the
decryption is the same as CP-ABE. For each child z of
a non-leaf node x, it calculates Fz = e(g1, g2)rqz(0). Let
Sx be a threshold-sized arbitrary set of children of x,
such that Fz 6= ⊥. Then interpolation and pairings are
used to calculate e(g1, g2)αs, and hence retrieve M .
Fx =
∏
z∈Sx
Fλiz , [i = index(z),
λi calculated over the indices of z ∈ Sx]
=
∏
z∈Sx
(e(g1, g2)
rqz(0))λi
=
∏
z∈Sx
(e(g1, g2)
rqparent(z)(index(z)))λi , [discussed in 3.1]
=
∏
z∈Sx
(e(g1, g2)
rqx(i))λi
= e(g1, g2)
∑
z∈Sx rλiqx(i)
= e(g1, g2)
rqx(0)
5Let A = e(g1, g2)rqR(0) = e(g1, g2)rs at the root R.
Decryption proceeds as follows,
C˜
e(C,D)
A
=Me(g1, g2)
αs e(g1, g2)
rs
e(g1, g2)αs+rs
=M
Explanation of Asymmetric Group:
We use different groups for C ′i and D
′
i (i is the
attribute). The user gets C ′i converted to C
′′
i = C
′
i
a
(a =
∑t
j=1 λjP (uj), explained in the Convert algo-
rithm) by the proxy. However, if both C ′i and D
′
i
belong to the same group, and the user gives the
proxy D′i instead of C
′
i, she will get (D
′
i)
a = gari .
She will also get λk, which she can use to get
D′′i
λk = gλkP (uk)ri . Multiplying these two, she gets
gri(a+λkP (uk)) = griP (0). She can use this last value
to decrypt any ciphertext without using the proxy, so
the revocation is no longer effective. Therefore, we use
asymmetric pairing, where C ′i and D
′
i are in different
groups and mapping of D′i into the C
′
i group is not
possible.
3.3 Delegation of Access
We design delegation of attributes in PIRATTE in two
settings - 1) When all the keys to different parties are
issued by a single key authority, and 2) When keys
are issued by multiple key authorities.
3.3.1 Single Key Authority
In the single authority setting, a user uk gets a secret
key SK from key authority KA, and delegates one
or more of the attributes that she possesses in her
secret key to another user. As long as uk is not re-
voked, the delegated key can be used for decryption.
The delegation process is as follows. The delegation
algorithm takes in a secret key SK issued for a set
of attributes S and delegates one or more attributes
from this set. The delegated key ˜SK is generated
for the subset of attributes S˜ ⊆ S. For delegation
in single authority setting, an extra public parameter
f = g
1/β
2 is introduced in the public key PK. Let
random r˜ ∈ Zp, and random ∀j ∈ S˜, r˜j ∈ Zp.
˜SK = (D˜,∀j ∈ S˜ : 〈D˜j , D′j , D˜′′j 〉),where
D˜ = (D)f r˜ = g
(α+r+r˜)/β
2
D˜j = (Dj)g
r˜
2H(j)
r˜j = g
r+r˜+hjrjP (0)+hj r˜j
2
D˜′′j = (D
′′
j )g
r˜j/λk
1 = g
rjP (uk)+r˜j/λk
1
Decryption proceeds are follows:
DecryptNode(CT, ˜SK, x)
=
e(Cx, D˜i)
e(D˜′′i , C ′x)λke(D
′
i, C
′′
x )
=
e(g1, g2)
qx(0)(r+r˜+hiriP (0)+hir˜i)
e(g1, g2)(riP (uk)+r˜i/λk)hiqx(0)λk
·
1
e(g1, g2)
rihiqx(0)
∑t
j=1 λjP (uj)
=
e(g1, g2)
(r+r˜)qx(0)+hiriP (0)qx(0)+hir˜iqx(0)
e(g1, g2)rihiqx(0)λkP (uk)+hir˜iqx(0)
·
1
e(g1, g2)
rihiqx(0)
∑t
j=1 λjP (uj)
=
e(g1, g2)
(r+r˜)qx(0)+hiriP (0)qx(0)+hir˜iqx(0)
e(g1, g2)
rihiqx(0)(
∑t
j=1 λjP (uj)+λkP (uk))+hir˜iqx(0)
=
e(g1, g2)
(r+r˜)qx(0)+hiriP (0)qx(0)+hir˜iqx(0)
e(g1, g2)rihiqx(0)P (0)+hir˜iqx(0)
,
k 6∈ {1, 2, . . . , t}
= e(g1, g2)
(r+r˜)qx(0)
Let A = e(g1, g2)(r+r˜)qR(0) = e(g1, g2)(r+r˜)s for the
root node. The rest of the decryption proceeds as
follows,
C˜
e(C,D˜)
A
=Me(g1, g2)
αs e(g1, g2)
(r+r˜)s
e(g1, g2)αs+rs+r˜s
=M
3.3.2 Multiple Key Authority
The second version of delegation of access is designed
with a distributed setting in mind, i.e., when secret
attribute keys are issued from different key authorities
to different users. In this setting, A generates keys
for B and B generates keys for C; i.e., B is a contact
of A and C is a contact of B. Again, the delegation
algorithm takes in a secret key SK issued for a set of
attributes S and delegates one or more attributes from
this set. In the following construction, we will show
how B delegates a key SK for the set of attributes S
generated by A for B, to C.
SK = (D,∀j ∈ S : 〈Dj , D′j , D′′j 〉),where
D = g
(α+r)/β
2 ,
Dj = g
r
2H(j)
rjPA(0), D′j = g
rj
1 , D
′′
j = (D
′
j)
PA(B)
where random r, rj ∈ Zp, PA is the polynomial in A’s
MK, and B is B’s identity.
Attribute delegation allows B to delegate some
subset of attributes S˜ ⊆ S to his contact C. B re-
randomizes SK for C for a set of attributes S˜ ⊆ S.
˜SK = (D,∀j∈S˜ : 〈Dj , D′j , D˜′′j , D˜′′′j 〉),where
D˜′′j = (D
′′
j )
1/PB(0), D˜′′′j = (D
′′
j )
PB(C)/PB(0)
where PB is the polynomial in B’s MK, and C is C’s
identity.
6To decrypt a ciphertext CT encrypted with A’s
public parameters, A’s proxy calculates C ′′yA = (C
′
y)
XA
and λB , B’s proxy calculates C ′′yB = (C
′
y)
XB and
λC , and gives it to C. Here, C ′y is from CT , and
XA and XB are revocation information for A’s proxy
and B’s proxy respectively, calculated as XA =∑t1
i=1 λiPA(ui), XB =
∑t2
j=1 λjPB(uj). ui and uj are
the revoked users by A and B respectively, λi and
λj are the Laggrange’s coefficients for corresponding
revoked users, and t1 and t2 are the parameters for
the maximum number of revoked users by A and B
defined in their MKs. λB and λC are the Laggrange’s
coefficients for B and C respectively. B’s identity is
conveyed to C as a part of the communication for ˜SK,
or any other way. C does a modified bilinear pairing
in the DecryptNode, and finally decrypts the data.
DecryptNode(CT, ˜SK, x)
=
e(Cx, Di)
e(D˜′′i , C
′′
xB)
λBe(D˜′′′i , C ′x)λBλCe(D
′
i, C
′′
xA)
=
e(Cx, Di)
e(g0, g1)rihxqx(0)XBλBPA(B)/PB(0)
.
1
e(g0, g1)rihxqx(0)PA(B)PB(C)/PB(0)λBλCe(D′i, C
′′
xA)
=
e(g0, g1)
rqx(0)+rihxqx(0)PA(0)
e(g0, g1)rihxqx(0)λBPA(B)e(g0, g1)rihxqx(0)XA
=
e(g0, g1)
rqx(0)+rihxqx(0)PA(0)
e(g0, g1)rihxqx(0)PA(0)
= e(g0, g1)
rqx(0)
The rest of the decryption proceeds as before. If A
revokes B or B revokes C, the decryption will not
succeed since both the proxies participate in the de-
cryption, and the delegated secret key ˜SK contains
information about all A, B, and C.
3.4 Proxy-based Attribute Revocation
In this section, we describe how to revoke one or
more attributes from a given secret key. This is useful
since often the KA may want to merely revoke a few
attributes from her contacts instead of the whole key.
For instance, user A might want to remove friend
attribute from B, but B still remains in her colleague
group.
Intuition:
The idea is basically the same as complete key revo-
cation. The master key contains one polynomial Pi
of degree ti for each possible attribute i that the KA
can assign. Any attribute can be introduced later by
introducing a new polynomial in the MK. Pi(0) is
used to blind the corresponding attribute in the secret
keys. Each user u also gets a random share Pi(u) of
Pi(0) in her key. The proxy key consists of ti such
shares for each attribute in the policy used in the
ciphertext. Whenever some attribute is revoked from
some user, that share becomes a part of the proxy
key, and hence the converted ciphertext. Therefore,
the revoked user does not have enough points, i.e.
(ti+1) points for that specific attribute to unblind her
key and the ciphertext and decrypt it. However, non-
revoked users can always combine their secret keys
with the ciphertext and hence decrypt it. As before,
when no attribute is revoked, the proxy key consists
of ti random points for each attribute i.
- Setup: The KA generates one polynomial Py ran-
domly over Zp for each attribute y ∈ Y ′ where Y ′ is an
initial set of attributes in the system, and sets Py(0) as
the secret to be used to revoke the attribute. To revoke
an attribute from t users at a time, the degree of the
polynomials is chosen to be t. New attributes can be
introduced later by randomly generating polynomials
for them. Finally, she randomly chooses α, β ∈ Zp.
PK = G1,G2, g1, g2, h = gβ1 , e(g1, g2)
α
MK = β, gα2 ,∀y∈Y ′ : Py
- KeyGen(MK, S): The components of the secret
key are similar as before except that the polynomial
in each is specific to the attribute represented by
the component. Again, without loss of generality, we
assume user uk receives this key.
SK = (D,∀j ∈ S : 〈Dj , D′j , D′′j 〉), where
D = g
(α+r)/β
2 , Dj = g
r
2 ·H(j)rjPj(0) = gr+hjrjPj(0)2 ,
D′j = g
rj
1 , D
′′
j = (D
′
j)
Pj(uk) = g
rjPj(uk)
1
- Encrypt(PK, M, τ ): Encryption is similar as in
complete key revocation.
- ProxyRekey(PK, MK, ∀y ∈ Y : RLy): To revoke
an attribute y ∈ Y from t contacts, the KA creates a
t-sized list RLy = {ui}, i ∈ {1, . . . , t} of revoked users
for that attribute, and evaluates Py(ui) using MK. In
case of no or less than t revocations, she generates
random 〈x, Py(x)〉 to make RLy of length t. The set
of users from whom different attributes are revoked,
may or may not overlap. Without loss of generality we
assume that the sets of revoked users don’t overlap.
The proxy key PXK is constructed as follows:
PXK = ∀y ∈ Y, ∀ui ∈ RLy : 〈ui, Py(ui)〉
- Convert(PXK, ∀y ∈ Y : Cy): The proxy uses its key
PXK to convert the attribute relevant components C ′y
received from user uk to C ′′y as follows:
λyi =
uk
uk − ui ·
∏
j 6=i
uj
(uj − ui) ,
∀ui, uj ∈ RLy, uk /∈ RLy, RLy ∈ PXK
∀y ∈ Y : C ′′y = (C ′y)
∑t
i=1 λ
y
i Py(ui) = g
hyqy(0)
∑t
i=1 λ
y
i Py(ui)
2
∀y ∈ Y the proxy also calculates and gives λyk, to uk.
7- Decrypt(CT, SK): For each leaf node x where i =
attr(x), if i ∈ S (S is the set of attributes for which
SK is issued), and i is not revoked from uk then,
DecryptNode(CT, SK, x)
=
e(Cx, Di)
e(D′′i , C ′x)
λike(D′i, C ′′x )
=
e(g1, g2)
rqx(0)+hiriPi(0)qx(0)
e(g1, g2)rihiqx(0)λ
i
kPi(uk)e(g1, g2)
rihiqx(0)
∑t
j=1 λ
i
jPi(uj)
=
e(g1, g2)
rqx(0)+hiriPi(0)qx(0)
e(g1, g2)
rihiqx(0)(λikPi(uk)+
∑t
j=1 λ
i
jPi(uj))
=
e(g1, g2)
rqx(0)+hiriPi(0)qx(0)
e(g1, g2)rihiqx(0)Pi(0)
, k 6∈ {1, 2, . . . , t}
= e(g1, g2)
rqx(0)
Otherwise DecryptNode returns ⊥. The rest of the
decryption is as before. In summary, if an attribute
i is revoked from user u, he can not do pairing on C ′′x
and D′i. He can continue to use components related
to his other unrevoked attributes. Therefore, some of
his attributes are revoked whereas some continue to
be active.
4 SECURITY ANALYSIS
First, we need to define the requisite security prop-
erties for CP-ABE with Proxy Revocation. We present
the definition for identity-based revocation; the defi-
nition for attribute-based revocation is analogous. We
base our definition on the security model defined by
Bethencourt et al. [4], with the addition of revocation
and proxy operations. In this game, all encryptions
remain secure even when the adversary compromises
the proxy and obtains its key material, as long as this
happens after the most recent revocation.
Setup. The challenger runs the SETUP algorithm and
gives the public parameters, PK, to the adversary.
The challenger also runs PROXYREKEY(PK,MK, ∅) to
generate a proxy key PXK.
Phase 1. The adversary makes repeated queries to
KEYGEN to obtain keys for users u1, . . . , uq1 with sets
of attributes S1, . . . , Sq1 . The adversary also interacts
with the proxy by calling CONVERT with the input
({C ′1, . . . C ′r}, uk) for C ′i ∈ G1 and uk ∈ Zp, at which
point the challenger runs the CONVERT algorithm
with the stored proxy key PXK. Finally, the adver-
sary may call PROXYREKEY by supplying a revocation
list RL. This will cause the challenger to update the
proxy key PXK.
Challenge. The adversary submits two equal length
messages M0 and M1 and an access structure A∗. The
adversary also supplies a new revocation list RL∗.
RL∗ and A∗ satisfy the constraint that, for each user
uk, either uk ∈ RL∗ or Sk does not satisfy A∗.
The challenger flips a coin to obtain a random bit
b and returns Mb encrypted with the access structure
A∗. Additionally, it runs PROXYREKEY(PK,MK,RL)
and returns the resulting key PXK to the adversary.
Phase 2. The adversary makes repeated queries to
KEYGEN to obtain keys for users uq1+1, . . . , uq2 with
attribute sets Sq1+1, . . . , Sq2 . The new keys have to
satisfy that if uk /∈ RL∗, then Sk does not satisfy A∗.
Guess. The adversary outputs a guess b′ of b.
The advantage of an adversary is defined as Pr[b′ =
b]− 12 .
Definition 1: A ciphertext-policy attribute-based en-
cryption with proxy revocation scheme is secure if all
polynomial time adversaries have at most negligible
advantage in the above game.
4.1 Proof Sketch
We can prove the security of our scheme using a
variant of a generic bilinear group model. Note that
since the security of the original CP-ABE scheme relies
on the generic bilinear group model, the assumption
we make is only slightly stronger than the original.
In particular, we must work within an asymmetric
bilinear group, with a pairing of e : G1 × G2 → GT ,
such that there is no efficiently computable isomor-
phism from G1 to G2. (In a symmetric bilinear group,
a user could submit D′j to CONVERT and recover
g
rjP (0)
0 , obviating the need to use the proxy in further
decryptions.) This is believed to hold true for MNT
curves [12].
The generic asymmetric bilinear group model. Con-
sider three random encodings of the additive group
Fp represented by injective maps ψ1, ψ2, ψT : Fp →
{0, 1}m, where m > 3 log p. We will define G1,G2,GT
as the range of the respective map. We are given
access to a group action oracle for each group and
an oracle for a non-degenerate bilinear map e : G1 ×
G2 → GT (we will refer to the ranges of ψ1, ψ2, ψT
as G1,G2,GT , respectively). We are also given oracle
access to the isomorphism φ : G2 → G1 and a hash
function H : {0, 1}∗ → G2. Finally, we let gi = ψi(1)
for i = 1, 2.
Theorem 1: The construction presented in Section 3
is secure under the generic asymmetric bilinear group
model.
We sketch the main argument here; most of the rest
of the details are similar to the proof presented by
Bethencourt et al. [4].
Sketch: First of all, we can assume that no “unex-
pected collisions” happen between the maps, meaning
that if we keep track of the algebraic expressions
passed to ψ1, ψ2, ψT , and φ, two values are equal if
and only if the expressions are symbolically equiva-
lent. This assumption is true except for a negligible
probability.
For simplicity of presentation, we will assume that
A∗ contains a single attribute Aj for some j. Then after
phase 2, the adversary has the following elements
available:
8G1 : g1, gβ1 , C = g
βs
1 , Cj = g
s
1(= g
qj(0)
1 ), C
′
jg
hjs
1 ,
where s is the random secret used to encrypt the
challenge message and hj is implicitly defined such
that H(j) = ghj2 .
G2 : g2, D = g
(α+ruk )/β
2 , Dj = g
ru+hjruk,jP (0)
2 ,
Dj = g
ruk,j
2 , D
′′
j = g
ruk,jP (uk)
2
for each queried user uk where Aj ∈ Sk. Note that we
can ignore all Dj′ for j′ 6= j because, as with CP-ABE,
they will not help with decryption.
GT : e(g1, g2)α,M · e(g1, g2)αs
In addition, the adversary knows uk, P (uk) for all
the revoked users in RL∗. Note that we can ignore
any other elements of G1 obtained through calls to
CONVERT during Phase 1, or through calls to the iso-
morphism. This is because in order to guess correctly
with a non-negligible probability, the adversary needs
to compute e(g1, g2)αs. Since there are no occurrences
of s in G2, each pairing must involve gsk1 for some k,
and hence be derived from C,Cj , or C ′j .
The adversary can compute e(C,D(u)) =
e(g1, g2)
αs+rus, hence computing e(g1, g2)αs is
equivalent to computing e(g1, g2)rus for some user
u. Note also that the secret keys obtained for other
users are not helpful here, for the same reason as in
original CP-ABE. Algebraically, the adversary must
solve the following equation:
e(g1, g2)
rus = e
(
gx1 ,
(
D
(u)
j
)y)
e(g1, g2)
z
where x, y, and z are derived from the available
elements other than D(u)j . Note that x, y 6= 0, since
otherwise there is no way to introduce ru into the
right-hand side. However, the rest of the values are
independent of P (0), since the only values of the poly-
nomial available to the adversary outside of D(u)j are
P (uk) for uk ∈ RL∗, and thus are not sufficient to
determine P (0).
5 CASE STUDY: SOCIAL NETWORKS
Online Social Networks (OSNs) such as Facebook,
Google+, Twitter, and LinkedIn are becoming one of
the most popular ways for users to interact online.
Besides personal communication, OSNs provide the
perfect platform for online games and other applica-
tions. Users share personal information with the social
network provider, and trust the provider to protect
their sensitive information. However, this introduces
privacy risks, as the collection of information is an
attractive attack target [13]. Insiders can also release
private information either intentionally or acciden-
tally [14], [15]. Several recent privacy compromises
have thrown these issues into sharp focus [1], [2] .
These issues have motivated researchers to consider
a paradigm shift, where instead of trusting social
network operators and being dependent on them to
enforce privacy, users are in control of who views
their data, for example, via encryption [7], [8], [9],
[16]. Fine-grained access control is a key challenge
in this space; for example, Facebook and LiveJournal
have rolled out mechanisms to specify access control
policies for each post, as the data items are usually
destined for a subset of friends, or groups.
Persona [7] is a state-of-the-art design that proposes
the use of ABE to enable fine-grained access control.
In OSNs, ABE allows users to have complete control
over who can see their data, free from the whims of
the OSN provider. A user can create groups by assign-
ing different attributes and keys to her social contacts,
and then encrypt data such that only particular users
having the desired set of attributes can decrypt it. This
provides information protection from unauthorized
users on the OSN, third-party application developers,
and above all the OSN provider itself.
However, groups are dynamic and therefore user
attributes may change over time. This could be be-
cause of change in location, work environment, or the
nature or strength of the relationship with a contact.
Recent studies have shown that the user interaction
graph is much less dense than friendship graph [17],
indicating that users interact most frequently with a
small group of friends, further validating the need
for fine-grained access control. Moreover, the churn
rate for the interaction graph has been shown to be
quite high [17], motivating the need for access control
mechanisms to support dynamic groups.
Persona and similar designs introduce significant
overhead for group membership changes, especially
when a contact is removed from a group: all other
members of the group must receive a new key; addi-
tionally, all existing data items destined for that group
must be re-encrypted. This does not scale when group
sizes are large and group churn rate is high.
Data 
k1 k2 k3 
Key Assignment 
u1 u2 u3 
colleague OR (friend AND neighbor) 
Step 2 
Step 1 
Step 3 
KeyProxy (Revoke u1, u2) 
Proxy 
Modified CTcomponent 
Step 5 Decrypt iff not revoked 
CTcomponent 
Step 4 
A 
Fig. 1. Architecture of EASiER– OSN Built Using
PIRATTE
We propose an architecture for OSN using PIRATTE
as the underlying cryptographic scheme. Encryption
9successfully hides information from unintended par-
ties. Traditional OSNs allow people to establish only a
common relationship with each other by adding them
as friends. Further specialization is achieved by creat-
ing lists and adding friends to that list. Relationships
based on attributes make this task more expressive.
Figure 1 shows the architectural overview of an
OSN built using PIRATTE. We call this architecture
EASiER [18]. Users in EASiER become their own
key authorities, define relationships by assigning at-
tributes and relevant keys to the parties, and en-
crypting data under a policy that, if satisfied, allows
decryption to the intended parties. For instance, user
A assigns keys for attributes (colleague, neighbor) to
user B and encrypts data for the policy ‘colleague OR
(friend AND neighbor)’.
As mentioned earlier, the user interaction graph is
different from the friendship graph. People interact
with a subset of their defined contacts most of the
time. Recent privacy setting changes in wall posts
in Facebook also supports this fact. This requirement
needs ABE in OSNs to consider revocation of ac-
cess without re-encrypting all the data and re-keying
everyone in the group when access is denied to a
contact. For example, after encrypting data under
the mentioned policy, user A might want everyone
except u1 and u2 in her colleague group to decrypt the
ciphertext, either temporarily or permanently. Besides,
A might want to revoke the colleague attribute from
some of her contacts. PIRATTE provides this option
by introducing a minimally trusted proxy.
Upon revocation, the owner supplies enough in-
formation, in this case, a set of t (the maximum
number of revoked users allowed) revoked users to
the proxy to construct a proxy key. The proxy is
minimally trusted. Hence, the OSN provider or a third
party can act as proxy. An unrevoked user sends a
specific set of components of the ciphertext (details
described earlier) to the proxy. The proxy uses its key
to change these components such that only unrevoked
users can use it, mathematically combine it with the
rest of the ciphertext and their keys, and finally
obtain the plaintext. Since the conversion involves
only the lightweight components of ciphertext, it is
not expensive, as we will demonstrate later through
experiments.
However, PIRATTE does not allow the proxy to
decrypt the data since it does not have the attribute
keys. A new proxy key, created each time a revocation
takes place, prevents revoked users to collude with
the proxy or with each other to get the data. This
prevents the revoked users from decrypting even old
data unless they store it somewhere. We argue that
this is a desirable property: currently trusted contacts
are not likely to crawl the entire set of social network
data and store it for later use, but former friends or
colleagues might try to abuse their former status by
accessing past data.
Another example of an OSN that utilizes PIRATTE
is DECENT, a decentralized architecture for OSN [19].
It uses PIRATTE for cryptographic protection, DHT
for efficient data storage, and an object oriented ar-
chitecture for flexible data representation.
Friend-of-friend:
A challenge in using cryptography to enforce access
control in OSN is to support degrees of relationships,
such as friend-of-friend or contact-of-contact to be more
generic. EASiER handles this challenge by using the
feature attribute delegation in the distributed setting
described before.
In this approach, a user A generates a secret key
for her contact B with the attributes she wants to
assign to him. She also adds an attribute named fof
to the key. B uses the access delegation algorithm
to delegate this specific attribute (fof) to his contacts,
for example C. Whenever A encrypts a piece of data
with the policy attr1, attr2, . . . OR fof, C can decrypt
it with the delegated key that he received from B.
As in distributed attribute delegation, if A revokes
B, or B revokes C, the decryption will not succeed
since both the proxies are required to participate in the
decryption, and the delegated secret key ˜SK contains
information about A, B, and C.
6 IMPLEMENTATION AND EXPERIEMNTAL
EVALUATION
We implemented the constructions in PIRATTE, as
described in Section 3. Our implementation involves
introducing new components as well as modifying
different parts of the BSW CP-ABE toolkit [20]. The
current implementation supports complete key revo-
cation and access delegation in a distributed setting.
Similar techniques can be applied to modify it to
perform attribute revocation.
The implementation uses MNT curves [12] with
159 bit base field. All the experiments were carried
out on a 2.40 GHz Intel Core 2 Duo, 4 GB memory,
and running Ubuntu 10.04. We also implemented a
Facebook application to provide the functionality on
a social network. The code and the Facebook appli-
cation are available at http://www.soniajahid.
com and http://apps.facebook.com/myeasier
respectively.
6.1 Performance Analysis
We provide some information on the performance
evaluation of PIRATTE, and compare it with CP-ABE
both with MNT and super-singular curves. Though
CP-ABE implementation uses symmetric pairing, we
use asymmetric pairing for both PIRATTE and CP-
ABE in our implementation. This provides security by
preventing key and ciphertext components exchange
(discussed in Section 3). The results are shown in
Figure 2.
10
 0
 0.5
 1
 1.5
 2
 2.5
 3
 3.5
 4
 4.5
 10  20  30  40  50  60  70  80  90  100
Tim
e (
sec
)
No. of Attributes
CPABE-singular curve
CPABE-mnt curve
PIRATTE
(a) Secret Key Generation
 0
 0.5
 1
 1.5
 2
 2.5
 3
 3.5
 10  20  30  40  50  60  70  80  90  100
Tim
e (
sec
)
Leaf Nodes in Policy
CPABE-singular curve
CPABE-mnt curve
PIRATTE
(b) Encryption
 0
 0.2
 0.4
 0.6
 0.8
 1
 1.2
 10  20  30  40  50  60  70  80  90  100
Tim
e (
sec
)
Leaf Nodes in Policy
CPABE-singular curve
CPABE-mnt curve
PIRATTE
(c) Decryption
 0
 0.1
 0.2
 0.3
 0.4
 0.5
 0.6
 0.7
 0.8
 0.9
 0  100  200  300  400  500  600  700  800  900  1000
Tim
e (
sec
)
Users Revoked
Proxy Rekey
(d) Proxy Rekey in PIRATTE
 0
 0.1
 0.2
 0.3
 0.4
 0.5
 0.6
 0.7
 0.8
 0.9
 1
 50  100  150  200  250  300  350  400  450  500
Tim
e (
sec
)
Users Revoked
Conversion Precalculation
(e) Conversion Pre-calculation by
Proxy
 0
 0.1
 0.2
 0.3
 0.4
 0.5
 0.6
 0.7
 0.8
 10  20  30  40  50  60  70  80  90  100
Tim
e (
sec
)
Leaf Nodes in Policy
Conversion
(f) Conversion in PIRATTE
Fig. 2. Performance Analysis of PIRATTE and Comparison with BSW CP-ABE
Key Generation: Key generation time is linear with
number of attributes both in CP-ABE and PIRATTE.
Since it does an extra exponentiation, and generates
an extra component for each attribute in PIRATTE, the
result is justified. CP-ABE with supersingular curve
requires the least time.
Encryption: To test encryption and decryption, we
randomly generated 10 different policies for each of
the desired number of leaves (1, 5, 10, . . . 100). Encryp-
tion is also linear with respect to the number of leaf
nodes in the policy. We did not make any changes
to the encryption scheme, so CP-ABE with MNT and
PIRATTE both take the same amount of time.
Decryption: Decryption depends on the policy used
in encryption, and the attributes involved. We gen-
erated a decryption key with 100 attributes. It has
the superset of all the attributes used to generate the
policies, and so satisfies each of them. The decryption
results are shown with a 95% confidence interval. All
the lines show the performance when an optimization
was used to ensure the usage of the minimum number
of leaves in the algorithm DecryptNode. The required
time is still below 1 second.
Proxy Rekey and Conversion: PIRATTE involves
two extra costs before decryption: re-keying the proxy
and converting the ciphertext components specific to
the leaves in the policy. The re-keying results (Fig-
ure 2d) show that for even 1000 revoked users, the
time required is less than 0.9 seconds. This should be
compared with the time required to rekey the rest of
a group, i.e., generate a new key for everyone, when
even one person in the group is revoked.
Conversion primarily involves one exponentiation
for each of the leaf specific ciphertext components. It
also calculates λk for the requester uk, and completes
the λis for each of the revoked users. We perform an
optimization by allowing the proxy to pre-calculate a
portion of the λi’s in Convert. With the optimization,
the proxy needs to do 1 multiplication per revoked
user to calculate λi. It works as follows:
λ′i =
∏
ui,uj∈RL,i 6=j
uj
(uj − ui) , and l
′
i = λ
′
iP (ui)
li = l
′
i
uk
(uk − ui) = λ
′
i
uk
(uk − ui)P (ui) = λiP (ui),
∀ ui ∈ RL, uk 6∈ RL
Figure 2e shows the time required for the proxy
to do the pre-calculation. Note that this is a one-
time cost each time the proxy is re-keyed and is not
faced by users. Figure 2f shows the time required
to actually convert a ciphertext. The results are al-
most equal for the number of revoked users since
time to do t exponentiation dominates the time to
do t multiplication. Figure 2f shows the time for
500 revoked users. We expect the proxy to be more
powerful in terms of computing, and hence rekeying,
and conversion should be faster in practice. A user
performing decryption only faces the conversion time
shown in Figure 2f along with the decryption time
mentioned earlier.
Decryption with Delegated Key: We measured the
time required to decrypt a ciphertext with delegated
secret key in the multiple authority setting since we
used it in EASiER. We are interested in just one
attribute, i.e., fof being delegated for the OSN setting.
The policies used to encrypt the data contain the fof
attribute in the form: (attr1, . . .) OR fof. Therefore, the
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decryption needs to verify one attribute in the policy.
Hence, the time required does not depend on the
number of leaf nodes in the policy, and is constant.
In our experiment, this time is about 0.34sec.
TABLE 1
Element Size
Group Size (bytes)
G1 44
G2 124
GT 124
Zp 24
TABLE 2
Component Size
Component PIRATTE (bytes) CP-ABE (bytes)
Public Key 1316 1316
Master Key 152 + (t+ 1)24 148
Private Key 128 + (a+ 212)n 128 + (a+ 168)n
Ciphertext 168 + 8i+ (176 + a)l 168 + 8i+ (176 + a)l
Proxy Key 24t NA
C′′y 124l NA
Component Size and Communication Overhead:
Table 2 shows the sizes of the components involved
in the system for complete key revocation. Size of
the components for attribute revocation can be cal-
culated similarly. Elements from G1,G2,GT , and Zp
require 44, 124, 124, and 24 bytes respectively to rep-
resent(Table 1). Users have to communicate with the
proxy for conversion by sending C ′y , and receiving C ′′y .
These are represented using elements from G2. This
requires 124 bytes to represent (120 for the actual data,
and 4 for the variable size). Hence, conversion of a
ciphertext with l leaf nodes in the policy will need to
transfer 124l bytes each way. The user also sends uk,
and receives λk back. These are represented using Zp
which requires 24 bytes.
Public Key consists of a string describing the pair-
ing used (980 bytes), g1 and h from G1, g2 from G2,
and e(g1, g2)α from GT . Master Key consists of β from
Zp, and g2α from G2 in CP-ABE. In PIRATTE, it also
consists of a polynomial of degree t. The polynomial
consists of an integer t, and t + 1 coefficients from
Zp. Private Key consists of D from G2, number of
attributes n (integer), and n of 〈Dj , D′j〉s from G2 and
G1 respectively and attributes of length a (string) .
PIRATTE also contains n of D′′j from G1. Ciphertext
consists of C˜ from GT , C from G1, and components
for each node in the policy. Both intermediate (i
nodes) and leaf (l nodes) nodes have a threshold k
(integer), and number of children (0 for leaf, also an
integer). A leaf node has a string attribute of length
a, and Cy and C ′y from G1 and G2 respectively. Proxy
Key consists of t Zp elements.
Attribute Revocation: We can estimate the time
required to perform attribute revocation. All the al-
gorithms work similarly. The only extra work is in
Setup where instead of just one polynomial, a poly-
nomial is generated for each attribute in the system.
It requires 0.08sec to generate a polynomial of degree
100 and increases linearly with the degree of the
polynomial. Hence, generating a polynomial for each
attribute is scalable.
6.2 Facebook Application
Finally, we developed a Facebook application for PI-
RATTE as a proof of concept. The goal is to present
a high level idea of how an OSN that uses PIRATTE
will look like. We focused on Facebook because of
lack of deployment of decentralized architectures like
Persona and Diaspora [21]. In the current implemen-
tation, all protocol functions are performed at our ap-
plication server. Moreover for convenience, we chose
the client’s proxy server to be the application server
itself.
The application retrieves public profile information
of the users installing it using Facebook API, and uses
this data as its user profile information. Figures 3a
and 3b depict screen-shots of the same. Data is hidden
for privacy purposes.
When a user first installs our Facebook application,
an account is created in the application server. We
provide a brief description of the supported function-
ality.
• Setup: The Setup button is used to initialize a public
key PK and a master secret key MK.
• Key Proxy: The Key Proxy button is used to generate
a key for the proxy server. This is used to key the
proxy when there is no revocation. Each revocation
updates the proxy key, so there is no need to
manually rekey the proxy with each revocation.
• Add Attributes: The Add Attributes functionality
is invoked to define a set of attributes like family,
coworker, researcher, etc.
• KeyGen: The KeyGen functionality is used to gen-
erate keys for Facebook friends who also have
the PIRATTE application installed. These users are
assigned specific attributes, with the selection of
attributes being made from amongst the choices
defined in the Add Attributes step.
• Encrypt: The Encrypt button is used to generate a
ciphertext under a policy defined over the available
set of attributes. For convenience, application users
can choose and encrypt userid, about, and gender
for their contacts which is already retrieved from
their profile information (if available).
• Revoke: Users can select one or more contacts to
whom they assigned keys previously, and revoke
the keys from them.
• Decrypt: A user can click on any ciphertext gen-
erated by a contact who assigned her a secret key,
and is able to view the plaintext if his/her attributes
satisfy the ciphertext-policy. When a user clicks
Decrypt, the ciphertext is converted by the proxy,
and then the user secret key is used to decrypt the
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data. Names are not shown in the snapshot because
of privacy.
• Delegate: The Delegate option is used to delegate
the fof attribute from the keys a user received to her
contacts. It shows the list of contacts from whom
a user received secret attribute keys and to whom
she can delegate access to. Duplicates and self-
assignment are prohibited through checks.
(a) Main Page
(b) Revoke
Fig. 3. PIRATTE on Facebook
7 RELATED WORK
7.1 Revocation Schemes
Attrapadung and Imai address the revocation prob-
lem in [22] by combining broadcast encryption
scheme with both CP-ABE and KP-ABE. This scheme
requires knowledge about the list of all possible users
during encryption, i.e., attaches one component per
user to the ciphertext. Knowing the list of all possible
users in advance is inconvenient for most scenar-
ios, specifically OSNs. Bethencourt et al. in [4] and
Boldyreva et al. in [23] propose expiration-based revo-
cation scheme for CP-ABE and KP-ABE respectively.
In these schemes, the secret keys (CP-ABE) or the
ciphertext (KP-ABE) contain expiry time as an extra
attribute. Time-based revocation may not be a desired
property in several applications where an immediate
revocation is necessary. It introduces a window of
vulnerability, i.e., the gap between the desired time
from revocation to the actual time of revocation. Os-
trovsky et al. [24] present a new KP-ABE scheme with
non-monotonic access structure to support negation of
attributes. Revocation can be implemented by adding
a NOT-attribute to the policy in private key. However,
this will require re-keying the users from whom an
attribute is revoked.
Lewko et al. in [25] propose a revocation scheme
with small private keys. However, their approach also
increases the size of the ciphertext by incorporating
the list of revoked and unrevoked users with it.
In [26] Hur proposes a revocation scheme for CP-ABE
where each leaf node, i.e. attribute in the policy used
to encrypt the data contains a group of users who
possess that attribute. The scheme consists of a key
generation center (KGC) and a data storing center
(DSC). The DSC is equivalent to the proxy in our
proposed scheme. However, the approach requires
secret key update for all the users of an attribute
group from which at least one user was revoked; this
also includes the non-revoked users in that group.
The CCA secure construction of Yu et al. [6] in-
volves updating the master key component of each
attribute that has been revoked in the system. The
public key components are then updated and data
is encrypted with the new public key. Finally, proxy
re-keys are generated that enable a proxy to update
the user secret keys to the new version for all but
the revoked user. Basically the re-keying burden in
placed on the proxy, instead of users. We note that
the existing data would need to be re-encrypted by
the proxy; placing a significant burden on the system.
While our scheme is only CPA secure under the
generic group model (weaker security than Yu et al.),
it does not require re-encryption of existing data.
7.2 Proxy Based Re-encryption
Our revocation techniques are based on the notion of
proxy re-encryption. We will now briefly trace some
developments in this field, and discuss why the state
of the art techniques cannot be directly applied to our
setting.
Blaze et al. [27] introduced the notion of proxy re-
encryption, in which a proxy could convert a ciphertext
for Alice into a ciphertext for Bob, using a specially
generated proxy key. The holders of public-key pairs
A (Alice) and B (Bob) create and publish a proxy
key piA→B such that D(pi(E(m, eA), piA→B), dB) = m,
where E(m, e) is the public encryption function of
message m under encryption key e, D(c, d) is the
decryption function of ciphertext c under decryption
key d, pi(c, piA→B) is the proxy function that converts
ciphertext c according to proxy key piA→B , and eA, eB ,
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dA, dB are the public encryption and secret decryption
component keys for key pairs A and B, respectively.
In the El-Gamal based construction proposed by Blaze
et al., while the proxy cannot see the plaintext mes-
sage m, it can collude with B to recover the secret key
for A. Moreover, the construction is bidirectional, and
the proxy key can be used to convert ciphertext for
Bob into a ciphertext for Alice as well.
Ateniese et al. [28] propose unidirectional protocols
for proxy re-encryption based on bilinear maps, where
a re-encryption key from A to B does not imply a
re-encryption key from B to A. Canetti and Hohen-
berger [29] proposed the first CCA secure bidirec-
tional proxy re-encryption scheme, while Libert and
Vergnaud [30] proposed the first CCA secure unidi-
rectional proxy re-encryption scheme in the standard
model. We note that all of the above schemes are lim-
ited to the public key setting. Green and Ateniese [31]
extended the model to the identity based setting
by proposing a scheme for identity based proxy re-
encryption, but it was not until Liang et al. [32] that
the attribute based encryption setting was considered.
In the attribute based setting of Liang et al., a
user could designate a proxy, who can re-encrypt a
ciphertext with a certain access policy into another
ciphertext with a different access policy. Furthermore,
the authors showed their scheme to be selective-
structure chosen plaintext secure. However, it is not
possible to apply their construction to the problem of
attribute revocation because their construction does
not support negative attributes.
7.3 Social Network Privacy Architectures
We will now describe existing social network privacy
architectures and provide a comparison with EASiER.
We can categorize the different schemes based on the
level of trust for centralized services: a) trusted central
servers, b) untrusted central servers, and c) decen-
tralized architecture. Intuitively, decentralized archi-
tectures provide the highest level of privacy. EASiER
is close to Persona [7], which is the state-of-the-art
decentralized architecture for social network privacy.
In almost all of the settings, access control is per-
formed via encryption. We believe that the public key
encryption setting is not well suited for fine-grained
access control. Instead, PIRATTE uses attribute based
encryption techniques to enable users to perform fine-
grained access control. Moreover, none of the schemes
focus on the issue of efficient user/attribute revoca-
tion.
Trusted Centralized Architectures: Lucas and
Borisov [9] propose flyByNight, a facebook appli-
cation designed to mitigate privacy risks in social
networks. flyByNight users encrypt sensitive mes-
sages using JavaScript on the client side and send
the ciphertext to some intended party, i.e., Facebook
friends, who can then decrypt the data. The architec-
ture ensures that transferred sensitive data cannot be
viewed by the Facebook servers in an unencrypted
form. However, the utility of flyByNight is limited to
preserving the privacy of messages intended for social
network friends, i.e., email type communication, and
thus, it does not provide complete privacy. For exam-
ple, the application server knows a user’s friendlist
on facebook. flyByNight is also vulnerable to active
attacks by the OSN provider, since the OSN interface
is used for key management.
Singh et al. [33] propose the xBook framework for
building privacy preserving social network applica-
tions. xBook uses information flow models to control
what untrusted applications can do with the infor-
mation they receive. Their design retains the func-
tionality offered by existing online social networks.
xBook provides enforcement for both user-user access
control for data flowing within a single application, as
well as for information sharing with entities outside
xBook. Social network applications are re-designed to
have access to all the data that they require, but this
data is not allowed to be passed on to an external
entity unless approved by the user.
Untrusted Centralized Architectures: Guha et
al. [8] propose to improve user privacy while still
preserving the functionality of existing online social
network providers. Their architecture is called None
of Your Business (NOYB), in which encryption is used
to hide the data from the untrusted social network
provider. The key feature of their architecture is a
general cipher and encoding scheme that preserves
the semantic properties of data such that it can be
processed by the social network provider oblivious to
encryption. A user’s private information is partitioned
into atoms, and NOYB encrypts a user’s atom by
substituting it with the atom of another user. Thus
the OSN can operate on ciphered data, but only the
authorized users can decrypt the result.
Anderson et al. [34] propose a client-server archi-
tecture for providing social network privacy. In their
design, the server is a very simple untrusted social
network provider which serves as a data container,
while a complex client side architecture performs the
access control. The server only provides availability
and client is responsible for data confidentiality and
integrity. In addition to content data, the architecture
is also able to protect the social graph information.
Decentralized Architectures: As described earlier,
Persona [7] is the state-of-the-art decentralized archi-
tecture for social network privacy. EASiER is similar to
Persona as both use ABE, but EASiER also provides an
efficient mechanism for revocation, thereby avoiding
the overhead of re-keying with group members as
well as re-encryption of old data.
In the approach by Shakimov et al. [35], users
store their data in a Virtual Independent Server (VIS)
owned by themselves. These VISs form an overlay
network per OSN. The authors consider different
types of decentralized OSNs, depending on where the
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VISs reside: a) cloud b) desktop , and c) hybrid based,
and compare their privacy, costs and availability. Di-
aspora [21] is a decentralized OSN that users install
on their own personal web servers. Backes et al. [36]
present a core API for social networking, which can
also constitute a plug-in for distributed OSNs. They
assume that the server is trusted with the data while
implementing access control. Both of these approaches
avoid encryption.
PeerSon [37], LotusNet [38] and Safebook [39],
three decentralized designs for social networking ben-
efit from DHTs in their architecture. PeerSon and
Safebook suggest access control through encryption,
but they fall short in providing fine-grained policies
comparing to ABE-based access control. Safebook is
based on a peer-to-peer overlay network named Ma-
tryoshka. The end-to-end privacy in Matryoshka is
provided by leveraging existing hop-by-hop trust. In
all of these schemes overhead of key revocation affects
performance.
8 CONCLUSION
We presented a scheme called PIRATTE for efficient
revocation in Ciphertext Policy Attribute-based Encryp-
tion. We achieved this revocation scheme by intro-
ducing a semi-trusted proxy, leveraging ideas from a
group communication scheme, and combining it with
ABE. We also presented an architecture named EAS-
iER for Online Social Networks (OSNs) that enforces
access control through encryption using techniques in
PIRATTE. Although we showed the use of PIRATTE
in an OSN setting, it can be applied to any context
where ABE is used for data protection with dynamic
group membership. We implemented the scheme and
compared it with Bethencourt et al.’s CP-ABE. Our
results show that PIRATTE is scalable in terms of com-
putation and communication for OSNs; accordingly,
we have built a prototype application in the Facebook
OSN to provide such encryption.
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